The long term effects of conditional cash transfer programs on health: an analysis of Mexico's Oportunidades by Newcomer, Adrienne
 The Long-Term Effects of Conditional Cash Transfer Programs on Health: 
An Analysis of Mexico’s Oportunidades 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
Adrienne Joy Newcomer 
BS Mathematics-Economics, University of Pittsburgh, 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of 
Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the degree of 
Bachelor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Pittsburgh 
2017 
 
 ii 
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH 
Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis was presented 
 
by 
 
 
Adrienne Newcomer 
 
 
 
It was defended on 
December 1, 2017 
and approved by 
Michael Gecther, Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Penn State University 
Osea Giuntella, Assitant Professor, Department of Economics 
Alistair Wilson, Associate Professor, Department of Economics 
 Committee Chair: Rania Gihleb, Assistant Professor, Department of Economics 
 
 
 iii 
Copyright © by Adrienne Newcomer 
2017 
 iv 
 
Mexico’s conditional cash transfer program Oportunidades first began in 1997 in highly-
impoverished rural communities.  Since then, the program has expanded throughout Mexico and 
has been copied by governments worldwide.  The program aims to interrupt the intergenerational 
transmission of poverty by providing cash transfers to parents for sending their children to 
school, receiving regular check-ups, and complying with various other co-responsibilities.  Initial 
evaluations of the program were positive, but research on its long-term impacts has, thus far, 
been limited.  This paper uses the Mexican Family Life Survey to analyze the long-term impact 
of Oportunidades on the health of young adults who have aged out of the program.  Difference in 
difference estimators and the fixed-effect regression model are employed to measure the 
difference in health caused by increased exposure to the program.  It is found that longer 
exposure to Oportunidades does have a statistically significant, positive impact on the health of 
young adults.  These findings suggest that Oportunidades continues to impact former recipients 
after they age out of the program and support the theory that the program could help break the 
intergenerational cycle of poverty. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs are an anti-poverty measure designed to break the 
intergenerational transmission of poverty by encouraging parents to invest in the human capital 
of their children.  Since Mexico began the first major conditional cash transfer program 
Oportunidades1 in 1997, governments around the world have followed suit.  In Latin America 
CCT programs have been implemented by 19 countries and now cover around 19% of the 
region’s population2 (Cecchini and Madariaga 2011).  CCT programs target poor households and 
offer them cash transfers if they follow certain conditions.  These conditions generally include 
health, education, and nutrition components that are designed to increase the physical and mental 
capacity of participating children. 
 Oportunidades began in rural communities with high levels of poverty in 1997 and 
gradually expanded throughout Mexico.  As the program expanded, both communities with 
lower overall poverty levels and communities with larger populations have been incorporated.  
Today, it operates under the name Prospera and covers 6 million families.  The program includes 
health, education, and nutrition components such as a cash transfer for school attendance and in-
kind transfers such as nutrition supplements for young children and pregnant mothers.  Transfers 
                                                 
1 Oportunidades was originally called PROGRESA and is now called Prospera.  These names are used 
interchangeably throughout this paper. 
2 Approximately 113 million people as of 2010. 
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are conditional on the completion of familial co-responsibilities such as children maintaining an 
85% school attendance rate, mothers attending training workshops, and all family members 
receiving regular health check-ups. 
 Initial investigations into the effectiveness of Oportunidades yielded positive results, as 
have investigations into other CCT programs across Latin America.3  However, there are 
concerns over the long-term effectiveness of such programs and their ability to interrupt the 
intergenerational transfer of poverty.  Studies on the long-term effects of Oportunidades on 
education have shown positive results, but studies on the long-term effect on health are limited.  
This paper uses the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS) to analyze the long-term impact of 
Oportunidades on the health of young adults who have aged out of the program.  Difference in 
difference estimation is used in tandem with the fixed effects regression model to analyze the 
effect of increased exposure to Oportunidades on health.  Findings show that longer exposure to 
the program does have a positive effect on health, especially in communities with populations 
larger than 2,500 people. 
The remainder of this paper is divided into sections two through six.  Section two 
describes the theoretical base, conditions and benefits, targeting and expansion, and political 
history of Oportunidades.  Then, section 3 reviews previous studies on the impacts of 
Oportunidades on education, health, and nutrition.  Section 4 details the choice of dataset for this 
study and describes the sample that is used.  Section 5 discusses the empirical strategy of this 
paper, the empirical results, and the limitations of said results.  Finally, section 6 highlights the 
implications of this study and possibilities for future research. 
                                                 
3 See Schady et al 2008, Atanasio et al 2005, and Glewwe and Olinto 2004. 
 3 
2.0  PROGRAM BACKGROUND 
2.1 THEORETICAL BASE 
Conditional cash transfer programs are designed to interrupt the intergenerational transmission of 
poverty in two ways.  First, by providing an income effect in the short run, the programs provide 
parents with temporary relief.  Second, by tying transfers to health and education requirements, 
they should help increase the human capital of the children of recipients and increase the odds 
that those children will overcome poverty in the future.  This framework is supported by research 
linking human capital and poverty reduction.  For instance, several studies have found 
correlation between health and education levels, and others have found that level of education is 
a significant factor in the determination of income.4  These studies support the idea that 
increasing the human capital of children in poor families could disrupt the intergenerational 
transfer of poverty to those children. 
Oportunidades employs cash transfers because of the assumption that poor families 
underinvest in their children’s health and education not because they do not want to, but because 
the costs of doing so are too high (Poder Ejecutivo Nacional 1997).  For instance, the opportunity 
                                                 
1 See Alderman et al (1997), Becker (1993), Behrman (1993), Boissiere, Knight and Sabot (1985), 
Hoddinott et al (2013), Glewwe (1996), and Glewwe, Jacoby and King (1999), among others. 
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cost of children attending school, i.e. the income the students could have been earning were they 
working, is higher for low-income families than it is for high-income families.  It is likely that 
poor families would need to rely on their children’s income and thus, pull them out of school to 
work.  Ideally, Oportunidades would be a substitute for the children’s earnings, allowing them to 
attend school (Parker 2003). 
Additionally, cash transfers, as opposed to in-kind transfers, are a more flexible form of 
social assistance that allow parents to meet their children’s changing needs.  However, some 
have argued that cash is an ineffective transfer because, unlike in-kind transfers, it can be spent 
on non-essential goods like cigarettes or alcohol.  Oportunidades addresses this concern by only 
allowing female heads of households to receive cash transfers.  This practice is supported by the 
research of Hoddinott and Haddad (1995) and Thomas (1990), which found that women are 
more likely than men to use the resources under their control to improve the well-being of their 
children.  Evaluations of the Oportunidades show that the majority of cash transferred is actually 
spent on improving food availability in the household (Hoddinott and Skoufias 2000). 
Because its goal is to increase usage of education and health care, Oportunidades is 
considered a demand-side intervention.  However, the rollout and expansion of Oportunidades 
did coincide with some auxiliary supply-side interventions designed to increase the availability 
and quality of health care and education (Skoufias and McClafferty 2001).  These interventions 
were infrequent and occurred mostly in poor rural areas that originally lacked social services 
(Cecchini and Madariga 2011). 
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2.2 TARGETING METHODS 
Targeting appropriate beneficiary families is key to the efficiency of conditional cash transfer 
programs.  The intergenerational transfer of poverty is likely unaffected if cash transfers are 
made to parents who would have sent their children to school and provided them with adequate 
nutrition and healthcare in absence of the transfers.  Thus, Mexico utilized a rigorous 
combination of community-level geographic targeting and household-level proxy means testing5 
to effectively determine which households have the highest level of need (Skoufias, Davis and 
Behrman 1999). 
First, the index of marginality was used to rank overall community poverty levels.  This 
indicator focused on factors including illiteracy rates, average education level, access to 
electricity, water and drainage, average level of income, and housing conditions (Ávila, Fuentes 
and Tuirán 2001).  Access to education and health care were also considered, as residents need to 
access such resources in order to comply with the requirements of PROGRESA (Flores Romero 
2010).  Next, proxy means testing occurred on the household-level, which focused on indicators 
such as parental education level, the dependency ratio, the size of the home relative to the 
number of occupants, the type of floor in the home, and the ownership of assets like appliances 
(2010).  In eligible rural communities, program employees visited homes to collect information 
and determine household eligibility, but in urban areas, households had to sign up for a worker to 
visit and collect information (Parker 2003).  Thus, in urban areas, results may be influenced by 
self-selection into the program.   
                                                 
5 Proxy means testing uses a household’s observable characteristics to approximate their income or 
expenditures when other forms of financial documentation are difficult to obtain or inaccurate. 
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Once selected for Oportunidades benefits, families are eligible for three years.  They may 
stop receiving benefits before the end of this three-year period if their children age out of the 
program or if they do not comply with familial co-responsibilities.  At the end of the three-year 
period, families are re-evaluated to determine if they are eligible to re-enroll. 
2.3 CONDITIONS AND BENEFITS 
Oportunidades involves both conditions and benefits with regards to health, nutrition, and 
education.  These conditions and benefits have changed slightly over time as the program has 
evolved and expanded.  For instance, the size of schooling transfers has increased over time as 
have the grades for which transfers are available.  However, the main tenants remain the same 
with families receiving benefits and facing co-responsibilities in the areas of education, health, 
and nutrition. 
2.3.1 Education 
Education benefits and co-responsibilities are an integral part of the theory of Oportunidades.  
Parents receive these benefits if their participating children attend at least 85% of school days for 
10 months of the year.  Attendance in verified with the schools and if the child does not attend 
the necessary amount of days in a month, their families does not receive their education-related 
monetary transfer that month (Flores Romero 2010).  The size of the cash transfer is dependent 
on the age and gender of the student.  Transfers are larger for high school students because they 
have a higher opportunity cost of attending school, a cost that Oportunidades is designed to 
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mitigate.  For instance, monthly transfer in 2003 could be as much as 660 pesos ($66) for a girl 
in high school, 580 pesos ($58) for a boy in high school, and 210 pesos ($21) for children in 
primary school (Table 4). 
Additionally, girls receive higher transfers6 than boys because of the bias of parents 
against girls when deciding which children to send to school (Adato and Hoddinott 2010).  This 
bias has been observed in rural areas, where girls have higher dropout rates after primary school 
than boys (Parker 2003).  Education benefits were originally available for students grades 3-9 
(ages 8-15), but in 2001 they were extended to grades 3-12 (ages 8-21) (Parker 2003).  The size 
of transfers is also adjusted every six months for inflation.  Benefits are collected by a female 
head of household every two months, and the overall amount of benefits that can be collected by 
a single family are capped.   
Additional education benefits were added as Oportunidades evolved.  A school supplies 
grant is also available to mitigate the costs of schooling.7  This small grant is available to 
families when they enroll their children in school at the beginning of the year and again halfway 
through the school year.  A high-school completion grant was also added, which is a one-time 
transfer upon high school graduation.  This grant was enacted to encourage progression to higher 
education levels. 
                                                 
6 Transfers for girls are about 10-15% higher than transfers for boys (Parker 2003). 
7 Oportunidades beneficiaries have free access to public schools, so the costs described here are limited to 
school materials. 
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2.3.2 Health and Nutrition 
Health benefits include regular check-ups for all family members with a focus on preventative 
care.8  These services are provided free of charge to the families by public facilities.  Health care 
providers track usage and report back to program operators.  Nutrition benefits include a cash 
transfer for each family member, designed to allow the family to buy more, higher-quality food.  
Additionally, nutritional supplements are provided for children under the age of 2, malnourished 
children between the ages of 2 and 4, and pregnant and lactating mothers (Parker 2003).  To 
receive benefits, all family members must comply with the regulated number of health care visits 
and female heads of households must attend information sessions designed to teach good health, 
hygiene, and nutrition habits. 
2.4 POLITICAL HISTORY AND EXPANSION 
Oportunidades began in Mexico in 1997 under the name PROGRESA when it was piloted in 
several rural areas in the country.  The initial phase of the program involved a quasi-
experimental evaluation: 506 of the eligible communities were randomly assigned to treatment 
and control groups, with the treatment groups receiving benefits immediately and the control 
group being delayed until after 2000 (Gertler 2000).  Expansion of the program in rural areas 
continued during this time, and the program covered about 2.6 million families, or 40% of all 
rural Mexican families by the end of 1999. 
                                                 
8 See Table 5 for the frequency of health check-ups required of different age groups. 
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The program was expanded even further after the quasi-experimental evaluation yielded 
positive results.  In 2001, urban communities were added to the program and benefits were 
expanded to children in grades 9-12.  In 2002, the name of the program changed to 
Oportunidades after the election of President Vincente Fox.  There was initial concern that the 
program would be significantly altered by the new government (Parker 2003), but the key 
elements of the program were maintained, and expansion continued throughout Mexico 
(Yaschine and Orozco 2010).  By 2006, Oportunidades was available in most rural and urban 
areas, and covered one quarter of Mexican households (2010). 
In 2014, Oportunidades was rebranded again as Prospera (Dávila Lárraga 2016).  Once 
again, the main tenants of health, nutrition, and education remained in place as well as the use of 
proxy means testing for targeting and the completion of health and education co-responsibilities 
to receive benefits (2016).  The program has continued to expand under the name Prospera; by 
the end of 2014, it benefitted over 6 million families in Mexico (2016).   
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3.0  LITERATURE REVIEW 
Overall, studies on the effects of Oportunidades on education, health, and nutrition have yielded 
positive results.  Studies have found that boys and girls with exposure to Oportunidades have 
increased levels of schooling, decreased levels of stunting and anemia, increased height, and 
decreased adolescent labor force participation.  However, it is not yet known whether the 
positive results will transfer into a disruption of the intergenerational transfer of poverty.  Further 
years of data collection would be required to measure such an effect. 
3.1 EFFECTS ON EDUCATION 
The initial quasi-experimental evaluation of PROGRESA yielded encouraging results with 
respect to education (Parker 2003).  Specifically, participation in PROGRESA corresponded 
with an increase in school enrollment for all students but especially for girls in secondary school 
(Skoufias and McClafferty 2001).  It was estimated that enrollment for secondary school girls 
increased by over 20% and enrollment for boys increased by over 10% (Parker 2003).  It was 
also estimated that children would gain, on average, 0.7 additional years of education because of 
PROGRESA (Skoufias and McClafferty 2001).  Effects on primary school enrollment were 
small, which is probably because over 95% of children in rural areas were already enrolled in 
primary school before the rollout of PROGRESA (Schultz 2000).   
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Several studies used these initial results to extrapolate the possible results of the program 
in the long-run.  For instance, Behrman, Sengupta, and Todd (2005) uses two years of data to 
estimate that if children were to enroll in Oportunidades at age six and participate in the program 
for eight years, they would gain, on average, 0.7 additional years of schooling and the number of 
children who attend some secondary school would increase by 21%.  Meanwhile, Schultz (2004) 
extrapolates even further, using the two initial years of data to estimate lifetime levels of 
schooling and expected adult wages.  However, there are legitimate concerns that studies based 
on extrapolation may not be useful in this context (King and Behrman 2009). 
Further studies used additional data to analyze the long-term effects of Oportunidades on 
education.  For instance, Behrman, Parker and Todd (2011) utilize the original 18-month 
difference in program exposure to analyze the impact of Oportunidades on education after five 
and a half years of the program.  They found that the groups with the additional year and a half 
of exposure had completed more grades than the control group, with an increase of about 2.4% 
for boys and 2.7% for girls (2011).  Overall, these results corroborate the results from short term 
studies on school enrollment that also utilized the year and a half delay in program exposure 
during PROGRESA’s initial expansion. 
One potential qualification to Oportunidades’ success lies in achievement test scores.  
Behrman, Sengupta, and Todd (2000) found no significant increase in achievement test scores 
for participating children one year after exposure began, and Behrman, Parker, and Todd (2009) 
found no significant differences in test scores between the initial exposure group and the delayed 
exposure group for mathematics, writing, and reading.  On one hand, these results are 
disappointing because Oportunidades could have improved academic achievement in several 
ways.  First, participating children must maintain a certain level of attendance to receive benefits, 
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which could increase learning in the classroom.  Additionally, initial impact results showed a 
decrease in stunting and an increase in nutritional status for young beneficiaries.  This increase in 
health could also result in higher learning capacities and increased test scores.  However, it is 
also possible that the increase in enrollment caused by Oportunidades put additional strain on 
school’s resources, decreasing the quality of education provided.  This could negate any positive 
impacts on achievement scores and explain the lackluster results of these studies. 
Finally, it is important to examine labor force participation for young adults and how they 
are related to the effects of Oportunidades on education.  Behrman, Parker, and Todd (2011) 
looked at labor force participation in 2003 for young adults who received PROGRESA benefits 
in 1998 during the randomized expansion and compared them to young adults who did not 
receive benefits until 2000 or later.  They found that the additional exposure did correspond with 
a 4.1% decrease in the proportion of boys who were working in 2003, but there were no 
significant effects for girls (2011).  This suggests that more young men were staying in school 
instead of dropping out and seeking employment, which matches the expectations that 
Oportunidades will decrease labor force participation for children while they are of schooling 
age but possibly increase their labor force participation in adulthood. 
3.2 EFFECTS ON HEALTH AND NUTRITION 
When Oportunidades began, the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) was 
commissioned to run an official investigation into its effects.  This evaluation yielded highly 
positive results (Parker 2003).  A controlled, randomized experiment was built into the initial 
expansion of PROGRESA, with some eligible communities receiving benefits in mid-1998 while 
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others had to wait 18 months until 2000.  Gertler (2000) utilized this randomized experiment and 
found that both health and health care usage were higher in communities who received benefits 
in 1998 than those without Oportunidades benefits.  Usage of public health services for adult 
check-ups, child nutritional monitoring, and pre-natal care increased, while the number of 
inpatient hospitalizations decreased.  This, combined with the fact that the level of private health 
care usage remained constant, suggests that PROGRESA increased the usage of preventative 
care and decreased the rate of severe illness.  This hypothesis is supported by statistically-
significant reductions in the incidence of severe illness for PROGRESA children age 0-5 and 
PROGRESA adults age 18-50 (Gertler 2000). 
Further studies of the impacts of Oportunidades on health include Hoddinott and Skoufias 
(2004), which also used the experimental rollout of Oportunidades but focused on its nutritional 
impacts.  This study found that PROGRESA households increased their caloric intake as 
compared to controls, specifically increasing calories from fruits, vegetables, and animal 
products.  This implies that PROGRESA both helped families to eat more and to eat healthier 
(Hoddinott and Skoufias 2004). 
Rivera et al (2004) studied the impact of PROGRESA on the growth rates and rates of 
anemia in infants and young children in poor, rural households.  This study also utilized the 
randomized expansion of PROGRESA between 1998 and 2000.  It followed children age 0-12 
months in 1998 for two years, comparing those who received benefits in 1998 to those who 
received benefits in 1999.  After one year (when the 1998 group had received benefits but the 
1999 group had not), the rates of anemia were significantly lower in the 1998 treatment group 
than in the 1999 group.  However, this difference lessened and became insignificant by 2000, 
when both groups had received program benefits.  The study also found that PROGRESA was 
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associated with height increases, especially for infants less than 6 months old at the baseline 
from the poorest households (Rivera et al 2004). 
Leroy et al (2008) focused on the nutritional component of Oportunidades with respect to 
early childhood growth.  The study followed 432 children from urban areas who were less than 
24 months old from 2002 to 2004 to measure their growth.  Difference in differences with 
propensity score matching was used to assess the outcomes of child growth via height, child 
height-for-age Z-scores, and child weight-for-height Z-scores.  It was found that Oportunidades 
was effective in increasing infant growth in poor, urban households (2008). 
Fernald et al (2009) focused on the effects of the cash-transfer component of 
Oportunidades on child health.  Once again, it utilized the experimental rollout of PROGRESA 
to compare those who first received benefits to those who received them 18 months later.  The 
study isolated the effect of the cash transfers, as opposed to the health and educational conditions 
of participation.  Results showed that cash transfers were associated with increased height-for-
age z-scores, decreased anemia (measured through hemoglobin concentration in the blood), 
decreased levels of stunting, and decreased levels of children being overweight.  Thus, this study 
suggests that the cash transfer element of Oportunidades has a positive effect of the health and 
development of participating children (Fernald et al 2009). 
Farfán et al (2011) utilizes long term data from the Mexican Family Life Survey 
(MxFLS) and program information about the expansion of Oportunidades to compare children 
who received benefits since birth, those who received benefits before age five, and those who 
received benefits after the age of five or never received them.  These age groupings were 
selected to measure the impact of Oportunidades on the nutritional development of children.  The 
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study focused on child height and found that Oportunidades is associated with an increase in 
height among children in the poorest, rural communities (Farfan et al 2011). 
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4.0  DESCRIPTION OF DATA 
4.1 DATA SOURCE 
Much of the research on Oportunidades utilizes the Survey of Household Conditions 
(ENCAESH) in combination with Mexico’s rural household evaluation survey (ENCEL).  
ENCAESH data has been collected since 1997 and is used to determine Oportunidades 
eligibility.  ENCEL data was designed to measure the effect of the quasi-experimental expansion 
of PROGRESA and was collected every six months from 1997 to 2000, with follow-ups in 2003 
and 2007.  While these datasets are used in tandem to effectively evaluate the short and middle 
run effects of Oportunidades, there is concern over their use for long-term evaluation of the 
program.  Specifically, the ENCEL data suffers from a 60% attrition rate by its 2007 collection 
(Molina et al 2016).  Additionally, the attrition rate varies between the initial control and 
treatment groups, which could threaten the internal and external validity of results found using 
this data (2016).  Finally, impacts found using the ENCEL data do not represent the overall 
impact of Oportunidades because it only includes rural recipients in the poorest communities and 
the program has since expanded to urban recipients and rural recipients in communities with 
lower levels of poverty overall (2016). 
Thus, this study uses the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS) instead, a multi-thematic 
survey covering individual, household, and community level data.  The MxFLS is a nationally 
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representative survey, so it addresses the concerns about geographical and economic specificity 
of the ENCEL data (Rubalcava and Teruel 2006).  Additionally, the MxFLS has a significantly 
lower attrition rate than the ENCEL data because of its emphasis on tracking down and 
collecting responses from migrants (Molina et al 2016).  The 2009 MxFLS data includes 90% of 
the individuals surveyed in 2002.  Finally, the MxFLS follows respondents until 2009, two years 
after the last collection of the ENCEL data (Rubalcava and Teruel 2006). 
Two significant drawbacks exist when using the MxFLS data to analyze the long-term 
results of Oportunidades.  The first is that while PROGRESA began in 1997, the first round of 
the MxFLS occurred in 2002.  Typically, researchers would try to overcome this by pairing the 
MxFLS with other data sources, but the identifying information necessary to trace the MxFLS 
communities back to 1997 is not available for use due to confidentiality concerns.  Thus, analysis 
of the MxFLS cannot result in a true pre-program baseline.  Additionally, the MxFLS has a 
significantly smaller sample size than the ENCEL data (Molina et al 2016).  Despite these 
limitations, the MxFLS serves as a useful means of evaluating the long-term effects of 
Oportunidades. 
4.2 SAMPLE DESCRIPTION 
This paper analyzes the effects of Oportunidades on community-level data from the MxFLS.  
This strategy addresses concerns about the accuracy of household reporting of PROGRESA 
benefits in the MxFLS data.  For instance, in the 2002 data, 41.7% of households in rural 
communities involved with PROGRESA reported that they are enrolled in PROGRESA (Table 
1).  However, according to program records, enrollment rates in rural communities in 2002 were 
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much higher.  Thus, using community level as opposed to individual level data measures an 
intent-to-treat effect.  Additionally, spillover effects may exist within Oportunidades 
communities due to changing social attitudes about the importance of education and health.  
Analyzing the impact of Oportunidades at the community level instead of the individual level 
captures such effects. 
 
Table 1. Households Reporting the Receipt of PROGRESA, Rural Communities, 2002 
 PROGRESA Frequency Percent 
No 1,472 58.3 
Yes 1,053 41.7 
Total 2,525 100 
 
The sample used in this study includes 128 communities of varying sizes and income 
levels (Table 2, Table 3).  In 2002, 102 of the communities are enrolled in PROGRESA.  By 
2005, all communities have been enrolled.  Thus, the effect being studied here is a difference in 
exposure, not a pure treatment verses control effect. 
 
Table 2. Population and Oportunidades Benefits of Communities in 2002 
Population No Benefits Benefits Total 
> 100,000 people 8 25 33 
15,000-100,000 people 1 12 13 
2,500-15,000 people 1 16 17 
< 2,500 people 16 49 65 
Total 26 102 128 
 
Table 3. Population Wealth and Oportunidades Benefits of Communities in 2002 
Population Wealth No Oportunidades Oportunidades Total 
Poorest = 1 3 15 18 
2 8 24 32 
3 14 43 57 
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Table 3 (Continued) 
4 1 16 17 
Richest = 5 0 3 3 
Total 26 101 127 
 
The outcome of interest is the average health of community members ages 22-28, young 
adults who are no longer receiving Oportunidades benefits.  Their health is measured using a 
self-ranked scale with 1 representing poor health and 5 representing excellent health.  The health 
rankings of all eligible community members are averaged to create the community-level 
outcome.  Young adults age 21 and below are not included in the construction of the community 
measure because they are still eligible to receive Oportunidades transfers and could still be 
receiving free health care. 
For Oportunidades to interrupt the intergenerational transmission of poverty, the human 
capital of former participants would have to be increased.  Several studies have shown that the 
self-ranking of health is an accurate measurement of human capital.  For instance, McCallum, 
Shadbolt, and Wang (1994) found that self-ranked health variables are related to mortality in 
elderly Australians, a result that coincides with similar studies in North America.  Additionally, 
Idler and Stanislav (1995) found that self-ranked health variables predict the future functional 
mobility of individuals.  Appels et al. (1996) furthered confirmed that the correlation between 
self-health ranking and mortality persists across samples from different cultures.  Thus, a self-
ranking of health is used here to measure the actual health and thus, human capital. 
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5.0  EMPIRICAL STRATEGY, RESULTS, AND LIMITATIONS 
5.1 EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
This paper utilizes difference in difference estimation to evaluate the impact of exposure to 
Oportunidades in childhood on the health of young adults.  In recent years, the difference in 
differences estimation (DD) has become an increasingly popular tool for evaluation in 
observational studies and has been implemented in several studies about Oportunidades.9  In this 
method, the effect of an intervention, such as Oportunidades, is measured using two groups, a 
treatment group affected by the intervention and a control that is not.  They are compared by 
taking the difference between the post and pre-intervention levels of the treatment group and 
subtracting the difference between the post and pre-intervention levels of the control.  This 
double difference is both easy to understand and helps reduce many endogeneity problems that 
are typical to observational studies (Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan 2003).  Mathematically, 
the outcome of interest for the treatment group YT is compared to the outcome for the control 
group YC in 2002 (t=0) and 2009 (t=1).  Thus, the DD equation is as follows: 
(1) DD = (YT1-YT0) - (YC1-YC0) 
                                                 
9 See Behrman et al 2010, Leroy et al 2008, Skoufias 2005, Todd and Winters 2011 
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Here, the outcome of interest is the average health of community members ages 22-28, 
young adults who are no longer receiving Oportunidades benefits.  Their health is measured 
using a self-ranked scale with one representing poor health and five representing excellent 
health.  Individual health rankings are averaged across communities to create the indicator 
variable, health (See Table 8).  It is predicted that exposure to Oportunidades will have a positive 
effect on health.  Young adults ages 22-28 in 2002 are compared to young adults ages 22-28 in 
2009 from the same communities.  Ideally, the treatment group would only be exposed to the 
treatment at time t=1 and the control group would never be exposed.  Constructing such groups 
in this context proves impossible because Oportunidades began in 1997 and the first round of the 
MxFLS was taken in 2002.  Thus, the treatment communities were already exposed to the 
program in the first round of the survey.  However, until 2001, benefits were only available 
through age 15.  In 2001, they were extended through age 2.  It is unlikely that anyone age 22 in 
2002 received one year of benefits in 2001 because most young adults are finished high school or 
have dropped out by the age of 21.  Thus, while it is impossible to get a true pre-treatment 
estimate for the treatment group without data from 1997, the age group of interest and the 
timeline of the expansion of Oportunidades allow us to approximate one using 2002 data. 
It is similarly difficult to construct a control group that has never been exposed to 
Oportunidades because all communities in the sample were exposed by 2005.  This is due to the 
program’s gradual expansion and final goal of covering all sufficiently-poor Mexican families.  
Thus, the difference in difference estimation explores the impact of health of different amounts 
of exposure.  The members of the treatment group in 2009 were all exposed to the treatment at 
some point and could have up to 12 years of exposure.  Meanwhile, the control group ages 22-28 
in 2009 might not have experienced treatment at all, and those who were exposed had at most 6 
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years of treatment.  Thus, the difference in difference estimator here measures the effect of up to 
6 years of additional exposure to Oportunidades. 
In this study, difference in difference estimation is combined with the fixed-effect 
regression model.  The fixed-effect model eliminated the possibility of omitted-variable bias by 
only considering variation within communities over time, as opposed to variation between 
communities.  For omitted-variable bias to be completely eliminated, it must be assumed that all 
unobservable factors that influence both health and program exposure are time-invariant.  Here, 
the fixed-effect model is chosen over mixed models that also consider variation between 
communities because they can experience bias when unmeasured time-invariant factors impact 
both program exposure and health (Gunasekara et al 2014).  Such correlation might occur in this 
context because of the gradual and strategic expansion of Oportunidades.  Most rural 
communities were already exposed to the program before 2002, and rural communities that were 
delayed until after 2002 either did not meet the program’s overall community poverty 
requirements or were lacking other resources required for treatment10.  It is widely recognized 
that a connection between poverty and health exists.  Thus, unmeasured time-invariant factors 
could be both related to exposure and to health and the fixed effects model should be chosen 
over mixed models. 
When used to analyze panel data like the MxFLS, fixed-effects models represent the 
difference between each community’s average health at time t and the average value of 
community health over all periods.  The model is: 
                                                 
10 Rural communities with a high level of overall poverty were offered treatment earlier.  As the program 
expanded, communities with higher populations and lower overall poverty levels were also offered treatment. 
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(2) Y’it = β0t + β1X’it + ε’it 
Here, Y’it = Yit – Y”i , and Y”i is the mean of health, Yit over time.  Similarly, X’it = Xit – X”i and 
X”i is the mean of Oportunidades exposure Xit over time.  A corresponding definition applies for 
the measure of random error, ε’it.  Difference in difference estimation and the fixed effects model 
are combined to create the final model: 
(3) Y’it = β0t + β1(treat)’it + β2(opcom)’it + β3(post)’it + ε’it 
This model utilizes three dummy variables (See Table 8).  Opcom identifies members of the 
treatment and control group, post identifies whether the observation is pre-treatment or post-
treatment, and treat is the product of opcom and post.  β1 represents the difference in differences 
estimator and is predicted to be positive.  In order to obtain the aggregate outcome of 
Oportunidades on average health, the model weights communities by the number of young adults 
whose health scores were used to calculate the community average.  This weighting reduces the 
probability of one person’s health skewing results. 
5.2 EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND LIMITATIONS 
The model yields a positive and significant effect of increased exposure on the average health of 
young adults across communities.  When just considering the difference in difference between 
2002 and 2005 data, the treatment group’s increased exposure to Oportunidades is associated 
with an increase in average health of 0.15 when measured on a scale of 1 to 5 (Table 6).  This 
positive effect can also be seen in the difference in difference between 2002 and 2009 data, in 
which case, increased exposure is associated with a 0.10 increase in average health (Table 7).  
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These effects indicate that Oportunidades is reaching its goal of producing long-term increases in 
the human capital of its former participants.   
While these results are statistically significant, they are relatively small in magnitude.  
Their size could be limited for several reasons.  First, for the difference in differences estimator 
to be valid, two assumptions must be satisfied—the common shocks assumption and the parallel 
trends assumption (Ryan et al 2015).  The former assumes that the treatment and comparison 
groups will be affected equally by economic shocks and policy events from the time the 
intervention begins until the collection of the post-intervention data (2015).  This assumption is 
not directly testable, but there is reason to believe that it might not be satisfied in this study.  The 
MxFLS consists of communities throughout various urban and rural sectors of Mexico.  Changes 
of regional economic policies and macroeconomic shocks are not likely to affect all communities 
across all regions in the same way (Meyer 1995). 
The second assumption, the parallel trends assumption, states that although the treatment 
and control groups may have different outcome levels before the intervention, their trends in pre-
treatment outcomes should be the same.  This assumption is testable if there are several years of 
pre-treatment data available (Ryan et al 2015).  Unfortunately, this type of analysis is not 
possible in this case because the 2002 pre-intervention data is the earliest year of data available 
in the MxFLS.  Thus, it is possible that the first assumption is not satisfied, and it is impossible 
to know if the second is.  Although the fixed effects model addresses some of these concerns, the 
fixed effects model can be less accurate than regular regression or mixed models (Gunasekara et 
al 2014). 
The results of this study are also impacted by the data limitations of the MxFLS.  Only 
three years of data are available in this survey, none of which occur before PROGRESA began in 
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1997.  Because of this, the difference in difference estimation compares communities with two 
different ranges of exposure time.  Because these ranges are large, one cannot accurately 
estimate the effect of a single year of additional program exposure.  If information identifying 
the communities in the MxFLS was available, communities could be matched to Oportunidades 
program data detailing when exactly each community was exposed and what its socioeconomic 
conditions were before exposure.  If this were the case, a more accurate estimation of the impacts 
of Oportunidades on health could be performed. 
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6.0  CONCLUSION 
This paper finds that increased exposure to Oportunidades does have a positive impact on the 
health of young adults who have aged out of the program.  This effect is statistically significant, 
but small in size.  The magnitude of the result is likely limited by the limitations of the MxFLS 
and the resulting, unideal construction of the treatment and control groups.  Despite their small 
magnitude, these results indicate that the short-term impact of Oportunidades on the health of its 
participants does continue after the participants have aged out of the program.  This refutes 
concerns that the effects of Oportunidades might dissipate over time and supports the 
continuation of the program by Mexico’s government. 
It remains to be seen if the increase in health associated with Oportunidades will result in 
the disruption of the international transmission of poverty.  For this question to be properly 
answered, researchers must continue to collect data that follows former Oportunidades 
participants further into adulthood.  The question of Oportunidades’ impact of the health of 
former child participants could also be better answered if more data were available.  However, 
despite the data limitations that plague this study, the results support the theoretical claim the 
conditional cash transfer programs can have long-term impacts on the human capital of children, 
which might help them overcome poverty as adults. 
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APPENDIX 
6.1 OPORTUNIDADES CONDITIONS AND BENEFITS 
Table 4. Monthly Amount of Education Grant (Pesos), Second Semester 2003 
Grade Boys Girls 
Primary   
3rd year 
4th year 
5th year 
6th year 
105 
120 
155 
210 
105 
120 
155 
210 
Secondary   
1st year 
2nd year 
3rd year 
305 
320 
335 
320 
355 
390 
High School   
1st year 
2nd year 
3rd year 
510 
545 
580 
585 
625 
660 
Note: 10 pesos is $1 USD 
Source: Parker 2003 
 
Table 5. Annual Frequency of Health Care Visits Required by Oportunidades 
Age Group Frequency of Check-Ups 
Children 
Less than 4 months 
4 months to 24 months 
 
 
2 to 4 years old 
5 to 16 years old 
 
3 check-ups: 7 and 28 days, and at 2 months 
8 check-ups: 4, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21, and 24 
months with 1 additional monthly weight and 
height check-up 
3 check-ups a year: 1 every 4 months 
2 check-ups a year: 1 every 6 months 
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Table 5 (Continued) 
Women 
Pregnancy 
During postpartum and lactation 
 
5 check-ups: prenatal period 
2 check-ups: 1 in immediate postpartum and 1 
during lactation 
Adults and Youths 
17 to 60 years old 
Over 60 years old 
 
One check-up per year 
One check-up per year 
Source: Parker 2003 
6.2 FIXED EFFECT DIFFERENCE IN DIFFERENCE MODEL 
Table 6.  Difference and Difference for 2002 & 2005 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                         
N                    4094                
                                         
_cons               2.581***     (909.70)
opcom                   0             (.)
post               0.0555***       (5.80)
treat               0.149***      (14.16)
                                         
                   health                
                      (1)                
                                         
 
 
Table 7. Difference in Difference for 2002 & 2009 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                         
N                    4084                
                                         
_cons               2.581***    (1054.35)
opcom                   0             (.)
post                0.105***      (12.61)
treat               0.102***      (11.14)
                                         
                   health                
                      (1)                
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Table 8. Description of Variables in Fixed Effects Difference in Difference Regression 
Variable Description 
Treat Post*Opcom, difference in difference estimator 
Post 0 if year=2002, 1 if year=2005, 2009 
Opcom 0 if control group, 1 if treatment group 
Estrato Community population, 1 = over 100,000, 2 = 
between 15,000 and 100,000, 3 = between 
2,500 and 15,000, 4 = below 2,500 
 30 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Adato, Michelle, and John Hoddinott. "Conditional Cash Transfer Programs: A "Magic Bullet"?" 
In Conditional Cash Transfers in Latin America, edited by Michelle Adato and John 
Hoddinott, 3-25. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010. 
 
Alderman, Harold; Behrman, Jere R.; Lavy, Victor; Menon, Rekha. 1997. Child nutrition, child 
health, and school enrollment: a longitudinal analysis. Policy, Research working paper; 
no. WPS 1700. Washington, DC: World Bank.  
 
Appels, A., H. Bosma, V. Grabauskas, A. Gostautas, F. Strumans. "Self-reported health and 
mortality in a Lithuanian and a Dutch population." Social Science Medicine 42, (1996): 
681-689. 
 
Attanasio, Orazio, Battistin, Erich, Fitzsimons, Emla, Mesnard, Alice and Vera-Hernandez, 
Marcos. (2005). How Effective are Conditional Cash Transfers? Evidence From 
Colombia. The Institute for Fiscal Studies. Briefing Note No. 54 
 
Becker, Gary. (1993). Human capital. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Behrman, Jere, Susan Parker, and Petra Todd. 2009. “Medium-Term Impacts of the American 
Oportunidades Conditional Cash Transfer Program on Rural Youth in Mexico.” In 
Poverty, Inequality, and Policy in Latin America, Ed. Klasen Stephan and Nowak-
Lehmann Felicitas, 219–70. Cambridge: MIT Press 
 
Behrman, J.R., Parker, S.W. and Todd, P.E. 2011. “Do Conditional Cash Transfers for Schooling 
Generate Lasting Benefits? Five-year Follow-up of Progresa/Oportunidades.” Journal of 
Human Resources 46(1), 93-122. 
 
Behrman, J. R., P. Sengupta, and P. Todd. 2000. The impact of a schooling transfer program on 
educational outcomes: Evidence from Mexico’s PROGRESA experiment. Washington, 
DC: International Food Policy Research Institute. Mimeo. 
 
Behrman, Jere, Piyali Sengupta, and Petra Todd. 2005. “Progressing Through PROGRESA: An 
Impact Assessment of a School Subsidy Experiment.” Economic Development and 
Cultural Change 54(1):237–76. 
 
 31 
Behrman, Jere R., Susan W. Parker, and Petra E. Todd. "Do Conditional Cash Transfers for 
Schooling Generate Lasting Benefits?: A Five-Year Followup of 
PROGRESA/Oportunidades." Journal of Human Resources 46, no. 1 (2011): 203-36. 
doi:10.1353/jhr.2011.0028. 
 
Bertrand M, Duflo E, Mullainathan S. 2003. “How much should we trust differences-in-
differences estimates?” National Bureau of Economic Research. 
 
Boissiere, M., Knight, J. B., and Sabot, R. H. (1985). Earnings, schooling, ability and cognitive 
skills. American Economic Review. Vol. 75 (5), pp. 1016-1030 
 
Cecchini, Simone, and Aldo Madariaga. Conditional Cash Transfer Programmes: The Recent 
Experience in Latin America and the Caribbean. New York: United Nations, 2011. 
 
Dávila Lárraga, Laura G. How Does Prospera Work? Technical paper no. IDB-TN-971. Social 
Protection and Health Division, Inter-American Development Bank. April 2016 
 
de Janvry, Alain, Finan, Federico and Sadoulet, Elisabeth. (2006). Evaluating Brazil's Bolsa 
Escola Program: Impact on Schooling and Municipal Roles. University of California at 
Berkely 
 
Farfán, Gabriela, María Genoni, Luis Rubalcava, Graciela Teruel, and Duncan 
Thomas. Oportunidades and its Impact on Child Nutrition. Working paper. July 2012. 
Accessed June 18, 2017. 
 
Fernald, Gertler and Neufeld. 2009. "10-year effect of Oportunidades, Mexico's conditional cash 
transfer programme, on child growth, cognition, language, and behavior: a longitudinal 
follow-up study". LANCET, 2009 
 
Flores Romero, Karla Renata. Changing the Ability of the Poor to Generate Income: Mexico's 
Conditional Cash Transfer Program Oportunidades. Master's thesis, MIT, 2010. 
 
Gertler, Paul. Final Report: the impact of PROGRESA on health. Report. Food Consumption and 
Nutrition Division, International Food Policy Research Institute. November 2000. 
 
Glewwe, Paul. (1996). The relevance of standard estimates of the rate of return to schooling for 
education policy: A critical assessment. Journal of Development Economics Vol. 51 (2), 
pp. 267-290. 
 
Glewwe, Paul, Jacoby, Hanan and King, Elizabeth. (1999). Early Childhood Nutrition and 
Academic Achievement: A Longitudinal Analysis. International Food Policy Research 
Institute. Washington, D.C. 
 
Glewwe, Paul, and Pedro Olinto. 2004. "Evaluating the Impact of Conditional Cash Transfers on 
Schooling: An Experimental Analysis of Honduras' PRAF Program." University of 
Minnesota. 
 32 
 
Gunasekara, Fiona Imlach, Ken Richardson, Kristie Carter, and Tony Blakely. "Fixed effects 
analysis of repeated measures data." International Journal of Epidemiology 43, no. 1 
(2014): 264-69. doi:10.1093/ije/dyt221. 
 
Hoddinott, J., Alderman, H., Behrman, J. R., Haddad, L. and Horton, S. (2013), The economic 
rationale for investing in stunting reduction. Maternal Child Nutrition, 9: 69–82. 
doi:10.1111/mcn.12080 
 
Hoddinott, John and Haddad, Lawrence. (1995). Does Female Income Share Influence 
Household Expenditures? Evidence From Cote d'Ivoire. Oxford Bulletin of Economics 
and Statistics. Vol. 57 (1) 
 
Hoddinott, John, and Emmanuel Skoufias. "The Impact of PROGRESA on Food 
Consumption." Economic Development and Cultural Change 53, no. 1 (October 2004): 
37-61. doi:10.1086/423252. 
 
 
Idler, Ellen L., Stanislav V. Kasl. "Self-Ratings of Health: Do they also Predict change in 
Functional Ability?" The Journals of Gerontology: Series B, Volume 50B, Issue 6, 
(November 1995) S344–S353, https://doi.org/10.1093/geronb/50B.6.S344 
 
King, Elizabeth, and Jere Behrman. 2009. “Timing and Duration of Exposure in Evaluations of 
Social Programs.” World Bank Research Observer 24(1):55–82. 
 
Leroy, Jef, Armando Garcia-Guerra, Raquel Garcia, Clara Dominquez, Juan Rivera, and 
Lynnette Neufeld. "The Oportunidades Program Increases the Linear Growth of Children 
Enrolled at Young Ages in Urban Mexico." The Journal of Nutrition 138, no. 4 (April 
2008): 793-98. 
 
McCallum, John, Bruce Shadbolt, and Dong Wang. "Self-rated health and survival: 7 years 
follow-up study of Australian elderly." American Journal of Public Health 84, no. 7 (July 
1994): 1100-105. 
 
Meyer, Bruce, “Natural and Quasi-Natural Experiments in Economics,” Journal of Business and 
Economic Statistics, XII (1995), 151-162. 
 
Molina-Millan, Teresa, Tania Barham, Karen Macours, John A. Maluccio, and Marco 
Stampini. Long-Term Impacts of Conditional Cash Transfers in Latin America: Review of 
the Evidence. Technical paper no. IDB-TN-923. Social Protection and Health Division, 
Inter-American Development Bank. January 2016. 
 
Parker, Susan W. Case Study. Shanghai Poverty Conference - Scaling Up Poverty Reduction. 
April 20, 2003. 
 
 33 
Parker, S., Rubalcava, L., Teruel, G. (2012). “Do Conditional Cash Transfer Programs Improve 
Work and Earnings among its Youth Beneficiaries? Evidence after a Decade of a 
Mexican Cash Transfer Program.” Unpublished manuscript. 
 
Poder Ejecutivo Federal. 1997. Progresa: Programa de Educación, Salud y Alimentación. 
 
Rivera, Juan A., Daniela Sotres-Alvarez, Jean-Pierre Habicht, Teresa Shamah, and Salvador 
Villalpando. "Impact of the Mexican Program for Education, Health, and Nutrition 
(Progresa) on Rates of Growth and Anemia in Infants and Young Children." Jama 291, 
no. 21 (June 02, 2004): 2563-570. doi:10.1001/jama.291.21.2563. 
 
Rubalcava, Luis and Teruel, Graciela (2006). “Mexican Family Life Survey, Second Round”, 
Working Paper, www.ennvih-mxfls.org. 
 
Rubalcava, Luis and Teruel, Graciela (2013). “Mexican Family Life Survey, Third Round”, 
Working Paper, www.ennvih-mxfls.org. 
 
Ryan, Andrew M., James F. Burgess, and Justin B. Dimick. "Why We Should Not Be Indifferent 
to Specification Choices for Difference-in-Differences." Health Services Research 50, 
no. 4 (2015): 1211-235. doi:10.1111/1475-6773.12270. 
 
Schady, Norbert, Maria Caridad Araujo, Ximena Peña, and Luis F. López-Calva. "Cash 
Transfers, Conditions, and School Enrollment in Ecuador." Economía 8, no. 2 (Spring 
2008): 43-77. doi:10.1353/eco.0.0004. 
 
Schultz, T. P. 2000. School subsidies for the poor: Evaluating a Mexican strategy for reducing 
poverty. June. Report submitted to PROGRESA. International Food Policy Research 
Institute, Washington, D.C.  
 
Schultz, T. Paul. 2004. “School Subsidies for the Poor: Evaluating a Mexican Strategy for 
Reducing Poverty.” Journal of Development Economics 74(1):199–250. 
 
Skoufias, Emmanuel. PROGRESA and Its Impacts on the Welfare of Rural Households in 
Mexico. Report no. 139. International Food Policy Research Institute. Washington DC, 
2005. 
 
Skoufias, Emanuel, Davis, Benjamin and Behrman Jere. (1999). An Evaluation of the Selection 
of Beneficiary Households in the Education, Health, and Nutrition Program 
(PROGRESA) of Mexico. International Food Policy Research Institute. Washington, DC 
 
Skoufias, E. and B. McClafferty. 2001. Is PROGRESA working? Summary of the results of an 
Evaluation by IFPRI. Report submitted to PROGRESA. Washington, D.C.: International 
Food Policy Research Institute. 
 
Todd, Jessica E., and Paul Winters. "The Effect of Early Interventions in Health and Nutrition on 
On-Time School Enrollment: Evidence from the Oportunidades Program in Rural 
 34 
Mexico." Economic Development and Cultural Change 59, no. 3 (April 2011): 549-81. 
doi:10.1086/658347. 
 
Thomas, D. 1990. Intrahousehold resource allocation: An inferential approach. Journal of 
Human Resources 25 (4): 635-664. 
 
Yaschine, Iliana, and Monica E. Orozco. “The Evolving Antipoverty Agenda in Mexico: The 
Political Economy of PROGRESA and Oportunidades.” In Conditional Cash Transfers 
in Latin America, edited by Michelle Adato and John Hoddinott, 55-77. Baltimore, MD: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010. 
